Capmoney
Yield-Bearing StablecoinStablecoin protocol issuing cUSD, yield-bearing stablecoin minted 1:1 against USDC/USDT.
| Type | Yield-Bearing Stablecoin |
| Region | Global |
| Status | Active |
| Links |
M69 Score
Scored against the Money2069 Manifesto — see methodology. Higher = more aligned.
Key Findings
Detailed Rating Breakdown
Framework v0.2-alpha · Rated 2026-04-18Cap (Covered Agent Protocol, cap.app) is a yield-bearing stablecoin protocol that launched on Ethereum mainnet on August 19, 2025. It issues two products: **cUSD**, a USD-pegged stablecoin 1:1 redeemable against a basket of regulated stablecoins (USDC, USDT, pyUSD) and tokenized money market funds (BlackRock BUIDL, Franklin Templeton BENJI), and **stcUSD**, a yield-bearing wrapper. Yield is generated by a whitelisted set of institutional "Operators" (banks, HFT firms, market makers, DeFi protocols) who borrow from Cap's Credit Engine and must meet a dynamic hurdle rate benchmarked to Aave USDC supply rates. "Restakers" provide overcollateral via EigenLayer/Symbiotic delegations, backstopping operator default through Dutch-auction slashing. From an M69 perspective, Cap is a sophisticated institutional yield-bearing stablecoin — but structurally it is the antithesis of the Money2069 vision. Its unit of account is the US dollar, its reserves are ~100% fiat or fiat-equivalent (regulated stablecoins and Treasury-backed MMFs), its issuance is debt-based, and economic benefits flow to institutional operators and restakers rather than broadly to participants. The protocol is gated: only whitelisted operators can borrow, and access control is held by a Cap multisig with the power to upgrade core contracts. On the positive side, Cap has strong institutional backing ($11M seed from Franklin Templeton, Susquehanna, Triton, Flow Traders, Nomura Laser Digital, GSR, IMC), a Certora audit, meaningful early traction (TVL grew from ~$70M at launch to ~$500M by January 2026 per third-party sources), and a smart-contract-enforced overcollateralization + slashing architecture. But it explicitly imports every structural flaw the M69 Manifesto was written against: fiat dependency, debt-based issuance, gated access, and value extraction routed to insiders.
Issuance Model3x2.6
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| IM-01 | Is issuance permissionless?Anyone can mint cUSD by depositing whitelisted reserve assets (USDC, USDT, pyUSD, BUIDL, BENJI) with no KYC on mint. However, only whitelisted Operators can borrow reserves to generate yield — the credit/issuance-multiplier side is gated. | 3 |
| IM-02 | Is new supply created through debt?cUSD itself is fully asset-backed (1:1) not debt-based, but the protocol's core value proposition (stcUSD yield) is generated by Operators borrowing reserves — i.e., a debt-based credit engine sits at the heart of the system. | 2 |
| IM-03 | Is issuance tied to measurable real-world economic activity?Issuance is tied to deposits of fiat-backed stablecoins and Treasury-backed MMFs. No link to real-economy indices or productive output. | 1 |
| IM-04 | Does the issuance model have a supply cap or hard ceiling?No hard cap; supply is elastic to user demand but fully reserve-backed. Expansion/contraction driven by mint/redeem rather than economic signal. | 3 |
| IM-05 | Can supply contract (burn/redemption) as well as expand?Yes — users can burn cUSD for a proportional basket of underlying reserves at any time via the PSM. Permissionless on-chain redemption. | 4 |
Spending Power Stability2x2.9
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| SPS-01 | What mechanism does the protocol use to target spending power stability?2× PSM with multi-asset basket redemption, overcollateralized lending to Operators backed by slashable restaker delegations, and idle reserves deployed to Aave. Explicit on-chain mechanism to hold USD peg. | 3 |
| SPS-02 | What benchmark is used to measure spending power?2× USD — a single-reference fiat currency with meaningful inflation. Per rubric, USD = score 2. | 2 |
| SPS-03 | How transparent and verifiable is the stability measurement?1× Reserves and operations are on-chain; RedStone oracles provide price feeds. Public reserve dashboard. Underlying reserve attestations are issued off-chain by the stablecoin/MMF issuers. | 3 |
| SPS-04 | What is the protocol's historical deviation from its stability target?2× Live since August 2025 (~8 months at rating date). No reported depegs, but <1 year of live data. | 3 |
| SPS-05 | Does the protocol distinguish between short-term volatility and long-term purchasing power drift?1.5× Targets USD peg (daily price stability); does not address long-term purchasing power drift of the dollar itself. | 3 |
| SPS-06 | Is the stability mechanism accessible globally?1× Permissionless smart contracts on Ethereum; anyone with self-custody and gas can mint/redeem. Off-ramp to fiat requires external services. No explicit jurisdictional gate on core contracts. | 4 |
Fiat Independence & Interoperability2x1.3
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| FI-01 | What is the protocol's unit of account?2× Hard-pegged 1:1 to the US dollar. Name "cUSD" reflects the full borrowing of the fiat unit. | 1 |
| FI-02 | What is the fiat composition of the protocol's collateral or reserves?2× ~100% fiat or fiat-equivalent: USDC, USDT, pyUSD (bank deposits + Treasuries), BUIDL and BENJI (tokenized Treasury MMFs). | 1 |
| FI-03 | Does the protocol depend on fiat banking infrastructure to function?1× Protocol runs on-chain but the reserve assets themselves (USDC, BUIDL, BENJI) are fully dependent on Circle, BlackRock, Franklin Templeton bank accounts and Treasury markets. | 1 |
| FI-04 | Are the protocol's price feeds and oracles fiat-denominated?1× All feeds USD-denominated, sourced via RedStone (a decentralized oracle). | 2 |
| FI-05 | What happens to the protocol if the primary fiat currency it references collapses or depegs?1× A USDC depeg or USD collapse would directly impair cUSD since reserves are almost entirely USD-denominated. Listed explicitly as a risk by independent reviewers. | 1 |
| FI-06 | Does the project have a credible transition path from fiat-dominated adoption to fiat-independent operation?1× No stated transition path away from USD; fiat integration is treated as permanent. | 1 |
| FI-07 | Can local or sectoral currencies be denominated in or settle against this currency?2× No local currency composability design; monolithic USD-pegged product. | 1 |
| FI-08 | Does the protocol define open standards for interoperability with other monetary systems?1.5× Standard ERC-20; composable with generic DeFi but no protocol-specific monetary interop standard. | 3 |
Traction2x2.7
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| TR-01 | Is the project still active?2× Fully active; mainnet live since Aug 2025, ongoing Homestead rewards phase through July 2026, growing TVL. | 5 |
| TR-02 | How long has the project been in existence?1× Seed funding April 2025; mainnet August 2025. ~1 year old at rating date. | 2 |
| TR-03 | How many active users does the project have?2× Specific active-user counts not disclosed publicly. Airdrop of 12M cUSD went to "early users" but count unstated. Conservative scoring given uncertainty. | 2 |
| TR-04 | How many businesses or organizations accept the project's currency?2× cUSD is a savings/yield product, not used for merchant payments. No documented merchant acceptance. | 1 |
| TR-05 | Is the currency used as a unit of account?3× cUSD is quoted and used as "equivalent to USD"; not used as independent unit of account. | 2 |
| TR-06 | Is the founder or core team still actively working on the project?1× Founder/CEO Benjamin Sarquis Peillard and Cap Labs team are active and shipping. | 5 |
| TR-07 | What partner organizations or institutions support or integrate the project?1× Aave (80% of reserves deployed to Aave V3), EigenLayer, Symbiotic, EtherFi, M11 Credit, FalconX, RedStone, plus institutional investors Franklin Templeton, Susquehanna, Flow Traders, Nomura Laser Digital, GSR, IMC. 10+ partners. | 5 |
| TR-08 | Is the project covered or recognized by credible external sources?1× Covered by CoinDesk, Fortune, Yahoo Finance, The Defiant, Bitcoin News; blocmates and OAK Research analyst reports; Certora audit report. | 4 |
| TR-09 | Is adoption organic — not dependent on subsidies, incentives, or mandates?1× Strong incentive program: 12M cUSD airdrop, Frontier/Homestead "Caps" points program driving TVL. Adoption primarily incentive-driven at this stage. | 2 |
| TR-10 | What is the growth trend over the past 12 months?1× $70M TVL first week post-launch → ~$500M by January 2026. Strong growth. | 5 |
| TR-11 | Does the project have a coherent narrative and cultural identity that drives long-term commitment?1.5× "Verifiable money," "blow-up-proof," "Covered Agent Protocol" — consistent narrative but community engagement is transactional/yield-driven, not mission-driven. | 2 |
Sovereignty2.4
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| SO-01 | Can any single entity shut down the project?2× Cap multisig holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and can upgrade the AccessControl contract. Reserve assets (USDC, BUIDL, BENJI) can be frozen by their respective issuers. Multiple shutdown vectors exist. | 2 |
| SO-02 | Is the project's core infrastructure permissionless and self-hostable?1× Contracts on Ethereum, partially open-source (GitHub references exist). Infrastructure is on Ethereum — permissionless at the chain level, but core admin functions are not self-hostable. | 3 |
| SO-03 | Is the project subject to the jurisdiction of a single nation-state?1× Cap Labs is a corporate entity with institutional investors; jurisdiction not publicly specified but clearly has a concentrated legal footprint. | 2 |
| SO-04 | Does the project control or custody user funds?2× Users self-custody cUSD/stcUSD in their own wallets; non-custodial by default. However underlying reserves (USDC, BUIDL) are custodied by Circle/BlackRock. | 4 |
| SO-05 | Is the project resilient to key-person risk?1× Cap Labs team; founder is prominent. No evidence of distributed knowledge across 5+ contributors. | 3 |
| SO-06 | Does the project depend on any third-party service that could be revoked?1× Heavy dependencies: Aave (80% of reserves), Circle (USDC), Tether (USDT), BlackRock (BUIDL), Franklin Templeton (BENJI), EigenLayer, Symbiotic, RedStone. Multiple critical third parties could revoke access or freeze assets. | 2 |
| SO-07 | Can the project be censored — can specific users or transactions be blocked?1.5× cUSD contract-level freeze capability not confirmed, but underlying USDC/USDT have censorship capability and Circle/Tether routinely freeze addresses, which would affect Cap reserves. | 2 |
| SO-08 | Does the protocol protect transaction privacy as a monetary right?1.5× Pseudonymous (standard Ethereum) — transactions publicly visible on-chain, no explicit privacy features. | 3 |
| SO-09 | Does the technology enforce the project's monetary rules such that governance cannot silently override them?2× Contracts upgradeable by multisig via DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. No documented mandatory timelock or public review period. Smart-contract enforcement exists but silent override capability is present. | 2 |
Governance2.2
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| GO-01 | How are decisions about the project made?2× Decisions currently made by Cap Labs team and multisig admins. No fully-formalized on-chain governance process confirmed at this stage. | 2 |
| GO-02 | Who has voting or decision-making power, and how is that power distributed?1× Multisig signers (Cap team) hold decisive power. No public governance token voting live yet (CAP token governance mentioned in references [6] but voting system not confirmed at protocol level). | 2 |
| GO-03 | Is the governance process — and the monetary mechanism itself — transparent and publicly auditable?2× Monetary mechanism is on-chain and open-source; reserves dashboard public; governance process itself is informal/undocumented in public form. | 3 |
| GO-04 | Can governance be captured by a small group or hostile actor?1.5× Current multisig model is functionally "already captured" by the founding team; no capture-resistance mechanisms. | 2 |
| GO-05 | How are upgrades and changes to the protocol or project proposed and executed?1× Upgrades executed by admin multisig with no documented mandatory public debate or timelock. | 2 |
| GO-06 | Is there a separation between governance over monetary policy and governance over operational decisions?1× Hierarchical role system with separate admin roles (oracle admin, lender admin, vault config admin, emergency admin) provides some separation. | 3 |
| GO-07 | Does the project have a constitution, charter, or set of immutable principles?1.5× "Covered Agent Protocol" whitepaper articulates principles but no immutable constitutional protection. | 2 |
| GO-08 | Can the project's issuance rules be changed, and are monetary policy changes subject to stronger constraints than operational changes?2× Upgradeable via multisig; no special constraints confirmed for monetary policy changes versus operational changes. | 2 |
Resilience2.2
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| RE-01 | Has the project survived a major crisis or adversarial event?2× Live ~8 months; no major adversarial events yet. | 2 |
| RE-02 | Does the project have redundancy in its critical infrastructure?1× Multi-asset reserve basket provides some diversification; oracle via RedStone (single provider). Some redundancy but SPOFs exist. | 3 |
| RE-03 | Can the project recover from a catastrophic failure?1× Open-source contracts and public on-chain data allow recovery in theory; no documented disaster-recovery plan. | 3 |
| RE-04 | Is the project's design simple enough to be maintained and understood long-term?1× Multi-component system (minters, operators, restakers, Dutch auction slashing, EigenLayer/Symbiotic integrations, Aave integration). High complexity. | 2 |
| RE-05 | Is the project dependent on a specific technology that could become obsolete?1× Built on Ethereum mainnet with plans for multi-chain; EVM is widely supported. | 4 |
| RE-06 | How does the project handle economic stress (bank runs, liquidity crises, collateral crashes, inflation/deflation shocks)?2× Overcollateralization + Dutch-auction slashing designed to handle operator default; Aave deployment for liquidity. But would import stress from USDC depeg or MMF breakage, and mechanism is untested in real crisis. | 3 |
| RE-07 | Does the project have sustainable funding for long-term maintenance?1.5× $11M seed from institutional investors plus protocol fees; ~$500M TVL generates meaningful fee revenue. Funded for multiple years. | 4 |
| RE-08 | Can the system operate across extreme latency, disconnected networks, and multi-century timescales?1× Requires low-latency Ethereum connectivity; not designed for high-latency or disconnected operation. | 2 |
| RE-09 | Is the system designed for a world where AI agents are primary economic actors?1× Fully programmable ERC-20; AI agents can interact via standard smart contract interfaces. But operator whitelisting may exclude non-human actors from credit side. | 3 |
Inclusivity2.3
| Code | Question | Score |
|---|---|---|
| IN-01 | Can anyone in the world participate regardless of nationality, wealth, or status?2× cUSD contracts are permissionless on Ethereum, but underlying reserve issuers (Circle, BlackRock, Franklin Templeton) apply sanctions and KYC at the asset level. Sanctioned addresses are blocked. | 3 |
| IN-02 | What is the minimum cost to start using the project?1× Ethereum mainnet gas fees ($2–$30+ per transaction) create a meaningful barrier. | 2 |
| IN-03 | Does the project actively serve underbanked or financially excluded populations?1× Target audience is explicitly institutional capital and crypto yield-seekers, not underbanked populations. | 1 |
| IN-04 | Does the project distribute economic benefits — including seigniorage — broadly, or concentrate them among insiders?1.5× Yield flows: hurdle rate to stcUSD holders, fixed premium to restakers, excess to Operators (institutional insiders). Protocol/team takes fees. Airdrop distributed 12M cUSD to early users. Meaningful insider concentration. | 2 |
| IN-05 | Does the project treat all participants equally under the same rules?2× Structurally unequal by design: a gated whitelist of Operators has exclusive access to borrow from reserves and capture excess yield. Retail users cannot be Operators. | 2 |
| IN-06 | Does the project require identity documentation or surveillance to participate?1.5× Pseudonymous at cUSD holder level; Operators are institutions subject to full KYC. | 3 |
| IN-07 | Does the project have mechanisms to prevent wealth concentration over time?1× Yield compounds proportional to holdings (stcUSD); no anti-concentration mechanism. | 2 |
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Capmoney (Cap) and what problem does it solve?
Cap (Covered Agent Protocol, cap.app) is a yield-bearing stablecoin protocol that launched on Ethereum mainnet on August 19, 2025. It issues two products: **cUSD**, a USD-pegged stablecoin 1:1 redeemable against a basket of regulated stablecoins (USDC, USDT, pyUSD) and tokenized money market funds (BlackRock BUIDL, Franklin Templeton BENJI), and **stcUSD**, a yield-bearing wrapper.
How is money created in Capmoney (Cap)?
Anyone can mint cUSD by depositing whitelisted reserve assets (USDC, USDT, pyUSD, BUIDL, BENJI) with no KYC on mint. However, only whitelisted Operators can borrow reserves to generate yield — the credit/issuance-multiplier side is gated.
How does Capmoney (Cap) maintain stable spending power?
2× PSM with multi-asset basket redemption, overcollateralized lending to Operators backed by slashable restaker delegations, and idle reserves deployed to Aave. Explicit on-chain mechanism to hold USD peg.
Is Capmoney (Cap) independent from fiat currencies?
2× Hard-pegged 1:1 to the US dollar. Name "cUSD" reflects the full borrowing of the fiat unit.
Who controls Capmoney (Cap) and can it be shut down?
2× Cap multisig holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and can upgrade the AccessControl contract. Reserve assets (USDC, BUIDL, BENJI) can be frozen by their respective issuers. Multiple shutdown vectors exist.
How widely adopted is Capmoney (Cap) today?
2× Specific active-user counts not disclosed publicly. Airdrop of 12M cUSD went to "early users" but count unstated. Conservative scoring given uncertainty.
Is Capmoney (Cap) still active and growing?
2× Fully active; mainnet live since Aug 2025, ongoing Homestead rewards phase through July 2026, growing TVL.
What are the main risks or weaknesses of Capmoney (Cap)?
Weakest category by far: Fiat Independence (1.3).: Cap is 100% USD-pegged, with ~100% fiat/fiat-equivalent reserves (USDC, USDT, pyUSD, BUIDL, BENJI). A USDC depeg or MMF breakage would directly break cUSD. No stated transition path away from fiat. This is the category where Cap sits at the antithesis of the Money2069 vision.
What makes Capmoney (Cap) unique from an M69 perspective?
Strongest category: Spending Power Stability (2.9).: Cap's multi-asset PSM with overcollateralized operator lending and on-chain slashing is a well-engineered peg mechanism, and reserves deploy to Aave for yield. Score is capped at ~3 because the target is USD (a moderately inflationary fiat) and live track record is under 1 year.
How is Capmoney (Cap)'s M69 Score calculated?
Capmoney (Cap) scores 2.4/5.0. Pillars: Monetary Sovereignty 2.3, Civilizational Durability 2.3, Universal Adoption 2.6. Strongest: Spending Power Stability (2.9). Weakest: Fiat Independence (1.3).