Red Global de Trueque

Mutual Credit / Barter Network

Largest complementary currency system in history. Grew from 20 neighbors in 1995 to 2.5 million participants during Argentina's 2001-02 crisis using the Credito mutual credit unit.

Type	Mutual Credit / Barter Network
Region	Argentina
Status	Historical

M69 Score

M69 Alignment2.4

Minimally aligned

1.02.03.04.05.0

Monetary Sovereignty2.4

Issuance (3x) + Stability (2x) + Fiat Indep. (2x)

Civilizational Durability2.1

Sovereignty + Governance + Resilience

Universal Adoption2.7

Traction (2x) + Inclusivity

Iss Mod3x

2.6

Stability2x

1.3

Fia Ind & Int2x

3.1

Traction2x

2.2

Sovereignty

2.5

Governance

1.4

Resilience

2.3

Inclusivity

3.8

Scored against the Money2069 Manifesto — see methodology. Higher = more aligned.

Key Findings

Strongest category: Inclusivity (3.8) and Fiat Independence (3.1)The RGT was purpose-built for the financially excluded. Zero-cost entry with a 50-crédito starter allocation, no identity requirements, over two-thirds female participation, and genuine service to populations locked out of the banking system during Argentina's worst economic crisis. The prosumidor concept — everyone is simultaneously producer and consumer — is a powerful egalitarian design principle.

The system achieved the largest organic adoption of any complementary currency in history2.5 million participants with zero subsidies, zero token incentives, and zero government mandates. Adoption was driven entirely by genuine economic need. TR-09 (organic adoption) scores 5/5, making this one of the most authentic demonstrations of grassroots monetary demand ever documented.

Weakest category and the defining lesson: Governance (1.4)Governance is the weakest category because the system had no transparency in issuance, no protection for monetary rules, no capture resistance, and no formal decision-making process. The founders' unilateral introduction of the franchise model, the documented self-enrichment through note appropriation, and the system's inability to prevent counterfeiting represent a comprehensive governance collapse. The 2001 RGT/RTS schism is a textbook case of what happens when monetary governance is informal.

The absence of supply control destroyed the currencyThe crédito experienced hyperinflation in 2002 because there was no cap on issuance (IM-04: 1), no contraction mechanism (IM-05: 2), no stability mechanism (SPS-01: 1), and no technological enforcement (SO-09: 1). The system could expand but could never contract. Anyone with access to a printer could expand the money supply. This is the mirror image of the Guernsey Experiment: where Guernsey had disciplined supply management but no technological protection, the RGT had neither.

Fiat Independence was structurally strong but practically fragile (3.1)The crédito had zero fiat reserves, zero banking dependency, and functioned when the peso system collapsed. It was genuinely fiat-independent in its architecture. But the peso peg, the absence of a transition plan, and the population's 89% preference for pesos meant this independence was born of necessity rather than design conviction.

Big takeaway: The RGT proves that grassroots monetary systems can achieve massive scale through organic demand alone — but also demonstrates that without supply discipline, technological enforcement of issuance rules, transparent governance, and anti-counterfeiting capability, even the most successful complementary currency will collapse under its own weight.The system's growth was its destruction: mechanisms that worked for a few thousand prosumidores at community scale became fatally fragile at 2.5 million participants. Any project seeking to learn from the RGT must solve the scale-governance paradox — how to maintain community trust and supply discipline as a monetary system grows beyond personal relationships.

Detailed Rating Breakdown

Framework v0.2-alpha · Rated 2026-04-10

The Red Global de Trueque (RGT), also known as the Global Barter Network, was the largest complementary currency system in recorded history. Founded on May 1, 1995, in Bernal, Buenos Aires Province, by Carlos De Sanzo, Horacio Covas, and Rubén Ravera — members of the Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional (PAR), an ecological NGO — the system began as a neighborhood garage sale and grew into a nationwide network of barter clubs (clubes de trueque) using a printed complementary currency called the "crédito." At its peak in the first half of 2002, during the catastrophic Argentine economic crisis, the network reached an estimated 2.5 million participants across approximately 5,000 nodes (marketplace locations), with an estimated $400 million in goods and services traded annually. The crédito was initially pegged 1:1 to the Argentine peso (itself pegged to the US dollar at the time). The system spread to Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador. From an M69 alignment perspective, the RGT represents a remarkable grassroots monetary experiment with several strongly aligned features: it was debt-free, community-issued money created to serve real economic needs; it operated outside the banking system entirely; it was deeply inclusive, serving unemployed and underbanked populations (with over two-thirds of participants being women); and it generated a powerful solidarity narrative rooted in ecological and social justice principles. The "prosumidor" concept — each participant as both producer and consumer — and the Twelve Guiding Principles gave the network a genuine cultural identity. Seigniorage flowed to the community rather than to private interests, and the system required minimal cost to join (new members received 50 créditos as a starter allocation). However, the RGT suffered catastrophic governance and resilience failures that ultimately destroyed it. The system experienced hyperinflation in May-September 2002 due to massive overissuance and counterfeiting of crédito notes. The founders' attempt to impose a franchise model (requiring nodes to purchase centrally-printed "arbolito" créditos) created a governance schism, splitting the network into the RGT and the rival Red de Trueque Solidario (RTS) in 2001. With no technological enforcement of monetary rules, no anti-counterfeiting capability adequate to scale, no supply cap or contraction mechanism, and no constitutional protection for issuance discipline, the system collapsed to approximately 10% of its peak size by 2003 and continued declining thereafter. The government's expansion of unemployment insurance to 2.5 million people in 2002-2003, which injected pesos into the same population, accelerated the crédito's abandonment. Today, small trueque activities persist in Argentina (and briefly resurge during economic crises), but the RGT as a system is defunct. The project is historically significant only, though its lessons remain vital for complementary currency design.

Issuance Model3x

2.6

Code	Question	Score
IM-01	Is issuance permissionless?Semi-open, permissioned set of issuers. Each node coordinator could request créditos from the network or, in many cases, individual nodes and regional networks printed their own currency variants. By early 2001 there were several dozen currency varieties in circulation. The RGT attempted to centralize issuance through its "arbolito" franchise model, but many nodes issued independently. Not a single-issuer monopoly, but not permissionless — issuance required being a recognized node coordinator within the network. [1][2]	3
IM-02	Is new supply created through debt?No debt mechanism. Créditos were printed and distributed to new members (50 créditos per person) as a starter allocation, not as a loan. The currency was explicitly interest-free. New supply was created through membership growth and node coordinator decisions, not through any borrowing or collateralization process. This is fundamentally debt-free issuance. [1][2]	5
IM-03	Is issuance tied to measurable real-world economic activity?Partially linked. The original design tied issuance to membership — each new prosumidor received 50 créditos upon joining, theoretically representing their commitment to produce goods or services for exchange. However, the connection between crédito supply and actual economic activity was loose and broke down at scale. There was no verifiable economic index, no oracle, no algorithmic link. Issuance grew with membership rather than with measured economic output, leading to massive oversupply when the system scaled rapidly in 2001-2002. [1][2]	2
IM-04	Does the issuance model have a supply cap or hard ceiling?No supply cap and no constraint mechanism. Supply grew unchecked as new nodes formed and printed their own créditos. The RGT's franchise model attempted to control issuance by requiring nodes to purchase centrally-printed arbolitos, but this was circumvented by independent printing. The absence of any cap or circuit breaker is the primary design flaw that led to hyperinflation in 2002. Supply was monotonically increasing with no governance-enforceable ceiling. [1][2]	1
IM-05	Can supply contract (burn/redemption) as well as expand?In theory, members were supposed to return their 50 créditos when leaving the network, which would have contracted supply. In practice, this rarely happened. There was no systematic burn, demurrage, or redemption mechanism. The network had no operational contraction capability. Supply only expanded — through new member allocations, unauthorized printing, and counterfeiting. The absence of contraction is the symmetrical failure to IM-04. [1][2]	2

Spending Power Stability2x

1.3

Code	Question	Score
SPS-01	What mechanism does the protocol use to target spending power stability?No explicit stability mechanism. The crédito was initially pegged 1:1 to the Argentine peso, but this peg was aspirational rather than enforced by any mechanism. No algorithmic adjustment, no rebase, no rate-setting. Stability relied entirely on community trust and the assumption that supply would match demand through organic membership growth. When the system scaled rapidly, no mechanism existed to maintain purchasing power. [1][2]	1
SPS-02	What benchmark is used to measure spending power?The crédito was pegged to the Argentine peso, which was itself pegged to the US dollar during the Convertibility era (1991-2002). This gave the crédito an implicit USD-equivalent benchmark. After the peso's devaluation in January 2002, the crédito's reference point collapsed. A Harvard survey found the practical exchange rate had fallen to approximately 2 créditos per peso by 2002-2003. Single volatile fiat reference. [1][2]	2
SPS-03	How transparent and verifiable is the stability measurement?No published methodology for measuring purchasing power stability. The peso peg was informal and not monitored. No price index was tracked. No on-chain or off-chain measurement system existed. The only available data on the crédito's real exchange rate comes from external academic research (Harvard survey) conducted after the fact, not from the network itself. [1][2]	1
SPS-04	What is the protocol's historical deviation from its stability target?Catastrophic deviation. The crédito experienced hyperinflation in May-September 2002, losing the majority of its purchasing power. The Harvard survey documented a 2:1 devaluation against the peso. Many participants reported créditos becoming nearly worthless as supply massively exceeded demand. This is a documented stability collapse, not a minor deviation. [1][2]	1
SPS-05	Does the protocol distinguish between short-term volatility and long-term purchasing power drift?No distinction. The system had no mechanism addressing either concern. The peso peg provided an implicit short-term anchor during the Convertibility era, but when the peso itself devalued in 2002, the crédito had no independent stability framework. Neither short-term volatility dampening nor long-term purchasing power preservation was addressed in the design. [1][2]	1
SPS-06	Is the stability mechanism accessible globally?The system operated primarily within Argentina, with minor presence in Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador. Créditos circulated only within specific nodes and regions. No global accessibility. The stability mechanism (such as it was — the peso peg) applied only within the Argentine trueque ecosystem. [1][2]	2

Fiat Independence & Interoperability2x

3.1

Code	Question	Score
FI-01	What is the protocol's unit of account?The crédito was its own named unit of account, but it was explicitly pegged to the Argentine peso at inception. Prices at trueque markets were set in créditos, and goods were priced in crédito units, but the peso served as the reference for valuation. The unit was nominally sovereign but functionally dependent on the peso. After the peso's collapse, the crédito's purchasing power drifted independently (at approximately 2:1 versus the peso), showing some de facto independence. [1][2]	3
FI-02	What is the fiat composition of the protocol's collateral or reserves?Zero fiat reserves. The crédito was not backed by any collateral — no pesos, no dollars, no gold, no assets of any kind. It was a pure fiat community currency backed solely by the mutual commitment of prosumidores to produce and exchange goods and services. This is fully non-fiat-backed, though also entirely unbacked in any material sense. [1][2]	5
FI-03	Does the protocol depend on fiat banking infrastructure to function?The system was explicitly designed to bypass the banking system. No bank accounts were required. Transactions were cash-like (physical paper crédito notes exchanged at market fairs). The entire point of the trueque was to provide economic activity when the peso banking system had failed. Zero banking dependency during operation. [1][2]	5
FI-04	Are the protocol's price feeds and oracles fiat-denominated?No formal price feeds or oracles existed. Prices at trueque markets were negotiated between prosumidores in crédito units, often informally referenced against peso prices for comparable goods. The peso served as an informal benchmark for price discovery but there was no systematic price feed mechanism. Pre-digital system with no oracle infrastructure. [1][2]	3
FI-05	What happens to the protocol if the primary fiat currency it references collapses or depegs?This was tested in real life. When the Argentine peso collapsed in January 2002 (losing ~70% of its value against the dollar), the trueque system initially surged in participation as people sought alternatives. The crédito survived the peso's collapse in the short term and briefly thrived. However, the crédito's own internal problems (overissuance, counterfeiting) caused its independent collapse within months. The system showed partial resilience to fiat failure but could not sustain itself. [1][2]	3
FI-06	Does the project have a credible transition path from fiat-dominated adoption to fiat-independent operation?No transition plan. The crédito was positioned as a parallel currency alongside the peso, not as a replacement. The founders' ecological vision included some aspirational independence, but no concrete roadmap for fiat independence existed. The 89% popular preference for pesos over créditos (documented in surveys) shows the population never intended the crédito as a permanent fiat alternative. [1][2]	1
FI-07	Can local or sectoral currencies be denominated in or settle against this currency?The RGT was itself a federation of local currencies. By early 2001, dozens of local crédito variants existed, each issued by different nodes or regions. The "arbolito" was the RGT's attempt at a common settlement currency. Regional networks (Zona Oeste, Mendoza, Córdoba) issued their own créditos. This is genuine multi-currency composability — local currencies settling against a common crédito standard — though it was messy and ultimately unsustainable. [1][2]	3
FI-08	Does the protocol define open standards for interoperability with other monetary systems?No formal interoperability standard. The RGT attempted to create a common framework through its franchise model and the Twelve Guiding Principles, but this was a social contract rather than a technical standard. Interoperability between nodes depended on mutual acceptance of each other's créditos, which frequently broke down (regional networks refused to accept others' notes). No open standard for cross-system settlement. [1][2]	1

Traction2x

2.2

Code	Question	Score
TR-01	Is the project still active?The RGT as a system is defunct. The network collapsed from 2.5 million participants to approximately 10% of its peak by 2003, and continued declining to about 5% thereafter. Small trueque activities persist in Argentina — particularly resurging during economic crises (2009, 2023-2024) — but the organized Red Global de Trueque network no longer operates at meaningful scale. A blog and Facebook page exist but show minimal activity. Historically significant only. [1][2]	1
TR-02	How long has the project been in existence?Founded May 1, 1995. The system operated meaningfully for approximately 7-8 years (1995-2003), with peak activity from 2001-2002. The concept has existed for over 30 years in the historical record, though active operation was much shorter. Scoring based on the system's total existence since founding. [1][2]	5
TR-03	How many active users does the project have?At peak (first half 2002): estimated 2.5 million participants across approximately 5,000 nodes. By July 2002, 7-10% of Argentina's population participated. Today: minimal. Small trueque groups persist but the organized RGT network has effectively no active users at scale. Scoring reflects current state — the system is defunct. [1][2]	1
TR-04	How many businesses or organizations accept the project's currency?At peak, the trueque markets included professional services (lawyers, doctors), food vendors, clothing sellers, and artisans across 5,000 marketplace locations. Thousands of micro-businesses and individual prosumidores accepted créditos. Today, no businesses accept the RGT crédito — the currency is no longer in circulation in any organized form. Scoring reflects current defunct status. [1][2]	1
TR-05	Is the currency used as a unit of account?During peak operation, prices at trueque markets were denominated in créditos. Goods and services were priced in crédito units, wages for work exchanged within the network were expressed in créditos, and the currency functioned as a genuine unit of account within the trueque ecosystem. However, peso denomination remained dominant outside the markets, and even within, peso-equivalent pricing was common. Today, the crédito has no unit of account function. [1][2]	2
TR-06	Is the founder or core team still actively working on the project?The original founders (Carlos De Sanzo, Horacio Covas, Rubén Ravera) are no longer actively operating the network. Heloísa Primavera, who led the rival RTS network, has continued academic and advocacy work on complementary currencies but the RGT itself has no active stewardship. The project is in caretaker mode at best. [1][2]	1
TR-07	What partner organizations or institutions support or integrate the project?During its peak, the RGT attracted attention from the Finnish government (which invited founders on a European tour in 1998), academic institutions (Harvard, ISS The Hague), and international complementary currency networks. The PAR (Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional) was the founding organizational partner. Today, no active partnerships exist. Academic interest persists through researchers like Gomez and Ould Ahmed. [1][2]	3
TR-08	Is the project covered or recognized by credible external sources?Extensively documented in academic literature. Georgina Gomez published a full monograph through Routledge (2009). Multiple peer-reviewed papers in IJCCR, Review of International Political Economy, Revue de la Régulation, and other journals. Coverage by CNN, IPS, major Argentine media. Cited in virtually every academic study of complementary currencies. Possibly the most-studied complementary currency system in history. [1][2][3]	5
TR-09	Is adoption organic — not dependent on subsidies, incentives, or mandates?Adoption was overwhelmingly organic, driven by genuine economic desperation. Participants joined because the peso economy had failed them — unemployment exceeded 20%, bank accounts were frozen (corralito), and the peso had lost 70% of its value. No subsidies, no token emissions, no yield farming. The 50-crédito starter allocation is a minor facilitation, not a financial incentive. The government's unemployment insurance expansion (not a trueque incentive) contributed to decline, not growth. [1][2]	5
TR-10	What is the growth trend over the past 12 months?The RGT collapsed over 20 years ago. Small trueque activities periodically resurge during Argentine economic crises (most recently 2023-2024 with the current inflation crisis), but these are informal, unorganized barter exchanges — not the RGT system. No meaningful growth trend. [1][2]	1
TR-11	Does the project have a coherent narrative and cultural identity that drives long-term commitment?Strong founding narrative rooted in ecological sustainability, solidarity economics, and the "prosumidor" concept (from Alvin Toffler's "The Third Wave"). The Twelve Guiding Principles provided a shared ethical framework. The system had genuine cultural artifacts — the principles, the prosumidor identity, the community market rituals, the ecological mission of the PAR. The narrative was powerful enough to grow the system from a garage sale to 2.5 million participants in 7 years. However, the narrative ultimately failed to sustain the system — solidarity eroded at scale, and the cultural identity could not prevent the governance collapse. Legacy persists in academic and complementary currency circles. [1][2]	4

Sovereignty

2.5

Code	Question	Score
SO-01	Can any single entity shut down the project?The Argentine government could have shut down the system through legal action but chose not to (it tolerated the trueque as a social safety valve during the crisis). The system was not shut down by a single entity — it collapsed from internal governance failures and external economic improvement. However, the RGT founders in Bernal controlled the franchise model and the arbolito printing, giving them effective veto power over nodes within their network. The system's decentralized structure provided some shutdown resistance (the RTS survived the RGT's internal problems), but no individual node was immune to local government action. [1][2]	3
SO-02	Is the project's core infrastructure permissionless and self-hostable?The "infrastructure" was physical: printed paper notes, marketplace locations (often community halls, parks, or parking lots), and face-to-face exchange. Any community could replicate the mechanism — print notes, organize a market, recruit prosumidores. This was demonstrated by the proliferation of independent nodes and regional networks. The mechanism is inherently "self-hostable" in the analog sense. However, there was no code, no protocol, and no digital infrastructure to fork or self-host. [1][2]	3
SO-03	Is the project subject to the jurisdiction of a single nation-state?Primarily concentrated in Argentina, with minor presence in Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador. The Argentine government tolerated but did not formally regulate the system. The RGT was subject to Argentine law and could have been regulated or prohibited at any time. The multi-country presence provides slight jurisdictional distribution, but Argentina was overwhelmingly dominant. [1][2]	2
SO-04	Does the project control or custody user funds?Fully non-custodial. Participants held physical crédito notes. No intermediary held funds on behalf of users. Transactions were peer-to-peer cash-like exchanges at market fairs. No accounts, no balances held by the network, no custodial relationship. Once créditos were distributed to a prosumidor, they had full physical control. [1][2]	4
SO-05	Is the project resilient to key-person risk?Significant key-person risk. The RGT was closely associated with its three founders (De Sanzo, Covas, Ravera) who controlled the Bernal headquarters and the arbolito franchise. Heloísa Primavera was similarly central to the RTS. The network schism in 2001 was partly driven by interpersonal conflicts among founders. However, the decentralized node structure meant that individual nodes could (and did) operate independently — when the RGT collapsed, some nodes survived autonomously. [1][2]	2
SO-06	Does the project depend on any third-party service that could be revoked?Minimal third-party dependencies. The system required physical meeting spaces (community halls, parking lots) and a printing press for notes. No digital services, no cloud hosting, no oracle providers. Marketplace locations could be substituted. The one critical dependency was the printing of crédito notes — whoever controlled the printing press controlled the money supply. For the RGT franchise, this was centralized at Bernal. [1][2]	3
SO-07	Can the project be censored — can specific users or transactions be blocked?Physical cash transactions at open-air markets are inherently difficult to censor at the transaction level. No blacklist, no freeze, no filtering capability existed for individual crédito transactions. However, node coordinators could expel members from their nodo, effectively blocking their access to the local marketplace. The government could have shut down physical markets (and occasionally did during the 2002 chaos). Transaction-level censorship was not possible; access-level censorship was possible through node governance. [1][2]	3
SO-08	Does the protocol protect transaction privacy as a monetary right?Physical cash transactions are inherently private. No digital trail, no transaction records, no surveillance capability. The government had no ability to monitor individual crédito transactions. However, participation in a trueque market was public and visible — attending a marketplace is a physical act. Privacy was a natural feature of the medium (paper notes), not an intentional design principle. [1][2]	3
SO-09	Does the technology enforce the project's monetary rules such that governance cannot silently override them?No technological enforcement whatsoever. Monetary rules were social contracts — the Twelve Guiding Principles and node-level agreements. Anyone with a printing press could (and did) create new créditos in violation of any rules. Counterfeiting flourished because there was no technological barrier to creating notes. The franchise model's rules were violated routinely with no enforcement mechanism. This is the system's fundamental sovereignty failure. [1][2]	1

Governance

1.4

Code	Question	Score
GO-01	How are decisions about the project made?Governance was informal and ad-hoc. The RGT initially operated through an "impulse group" of founders at Bernal. Decisions about currency design, franchise rules, and network policy were made by the founding group without a formal governance process. Regional nodes had Inter-zonal Commissions of Coordinators and Regional Credit Commissions, but these were advisory rather than binding. The 2001 schism (RGT vs. RTS) resulted directly from the absence of legitimate decision-making processes. [1][2]	2
GO-02	Who has voting or decision-making power, and how is that power distributed?Decision power was concentrated among the founders at Bernal and regional node coordinators. No formal voting mechanism existed for the network as a whole. The franchise model gave the Bernal group control over currency issuance (nodes had to purchase arbolitos from them). Individual prosumidores had no formal decision-making power over monetary or network policy. Power was held by a small group of 3-7 people at the top. [1][2]	2
GO-03	Is the governance process — and the monetary mechanism itself — transparent and publicly auditable?Governance was opaque at the network level. The amount of créditos printed and distributed was not publicly disclosed or auditable. The Bernal group's finances and printing decisions were not transparent. At the node level, marketplace operations were visible (open-air markets), but the monetary mechanism (how many créditos were being created and by whom) was a black box. The lack of transparency in issuance was repeatedly cited as a cause of the system's collapse. [1][2]	1
GO-04	Can governance be captured by a small group or hostile actor?Governance WAS captured. The Bernal founders captured control of the RGT through the franchise model, requiring nodes to purchase their centrally-printed arbolito créditos and pay 4% on requested credit amounts. Additionally, the P2P Foundation documents "probable appropriation by the management group of large amounts of notes for their own gain." Counterfeiters also effectively captured the monetary system by printing fake notes at scale. Multiple forms of capture occurred simultaneously. [1][2]	1
GO-05	How are upgrades and changes to the protocol or project proposed and executed?No formal upgrade process. The franchise model was introduced by the founders without network-wide consensus, triggering the 2001 schism. Changes to credit issuance rules were made unilaterally by whoever controlled the printing press. No proposal process, no discussion period, no voting. Regional coordinators who disagreed simply left to form their own networks (Zona Oeste, RTS). [1][2]	1
GO-06	Is there a separation between governance over monetary policy and governance over operational decisions?No separation. The same node coordinators who organized marketplace logistics also controlled credit issuance, member admission, pricing guidance, and expulsion. The Bernal founders simultaneously ran the network administration and controlled the money supply through the arbolito franchise. Monetary and operational decisions were completely merged. [1][2]	1
GO-07	Does the project have a constitution, charter, or set of immutable principles?The Twelve Guiding Principles served as a de facto charter. These principles — synthesized during the first year of operation — addressed solidarity, reciprocity, and prosumidor ethics. They were the "only thing truly common to all nodes of the network." However, these principles had no binding force, no enforcement mechanism, and were routinely violated at scale. The principles were aspirational values, not immutable constitutional constraints. [1][2]	3
GO-08	Can the project's issuance rules be changed, and are monetary policy changes subject to stronger constraints than operational changes?Issuance rules had no protection whatsoever. Any node coordinator could change their issuance practices at will. The Bernal group changed the issuance model (from free distribution to franchise purchase) unilaterally. Counterfeiters changed the effective money supply at will by printing fake notes. No distinction between monetary and operational governance existed. This is the governance failure that killed the system. [1][2]	1

Resilience

2.3

Code	Question	Score
RE-01	Has the project survived a major crisis or adversarial event?The RGT faced and initially thrived during the catastrophic 2001-2002 Argentine economic crisis — membership surged from hundreds of thousands to 2.5 million as the peso economy collapsed. However, the system then collapsed under its own internal crises (hyperinflation, counterfeiting, governance failure) within months of reaching peak scale. It survived the external crisis but failed under internally-generated stress. The system was also subject to the government's introduction of competing unemployment insurance that drew participants away. Mixed record: survived one crisis, collapsed under another. [1][2]	2
RE-02	Does the project have redundancy in its critical infrastructure?Some implicit redundancy through decentralization. Thousands of independent nodes meant that no single marketplace failure would collapse the system. Multiple regional currencies provided monetary redundancy. However, the printing of notes was concentrated (centralized for the arbolito franchise), and no formal backup or failover mechanisms existed. The node structure provided organic redundancy, but it was not designed or maintained. [1][2]	3
RE-03	Can the project recover from a catastrophic failure?The system experienced catastrophic failure in 2002-2003 and has not meaningfully recovered in over 20 years. Small trueque activities persist but the RGT system was never restored. The concept is well-documented in academic literature and the mechanism is simple enough to replicate, but the specific network with its trust relationships and institutional knowledge was destroyed and never rebuilt. Partial recoverability in principle, demonstrated non-recovery in practice. [1][2]	2
RE-04	Is the project's design simple enough to be maintained and understood long-term?Exceptionally simple. The mechanism — print community money, distribute to members, exchange at open-air markets — requires no technical expertise, no digital infrastructure, no financial engineering. A community can implement it with paper, a printer, and a meeting space. This simplicity is what enabled the explosive growth from a garage sale to a nationwide network. The concept is understandable by anyone. [1][2]	5
RE-05	Is the project dependent on a specific technology that could become obsolete?Paper currency is technology-agnostic. The mechanism could be implemented with any medium — paper, digital tokens, mobile phones, blockchain. No specific technology dependency. The core concept transcends any particular implementation. This is a strength inherited from the simplicity of the design. [1]	5
RE-06	How does the project handle economic stress (bank runs, liquidity crises, collateral crashes, inflation/deflation shocks)?The system had no formal stress mechanisms. When the crédito experienced hyperinflation in 2002, there were no circuit breakers, no dynamic adjustments, no orderly wind-down procedure. The system simply collapsed. Members could not redeem créditos for any underlying value. No stress testing was ever conducted. The system was designed for fair-weather operation and broke immediately under monetary stress. This is particularly damning given that the system WAS the stress mechanism for the broader economy. [1][2]	1
RE-07	Does the project have sustainable funding for long-term maintenance?During operation, the system was largely self-funding through membership fees (50 créditos returned on exit, 4% franchise fee on arbolito purchases) and volunteer labor by node coordinators. No external grants or venture funding sustained the network. However, this funding model was inadequate — node coordinators worked unpaid, and the franchise fees created governance conflicts. Today, no funding exists. [1][2]	2
RE-08	Can the system operate across extreme latency, disconnected networks, and multi-century timescales?Physical cash inherently operates in disconnected, high-latency environments. The trueque required no electronic network or telecommunications. Markets operated independently across Argentina without real-time coordination. The concept is simple enough to persist across centuries. In this specific regard, the system was more resilient than any digital system. However, the system actually existed in a single-era context and never demonstrated multi-century persistence. [1][2]	4
RE-09	Is the system designed for a world where AI agents are primary economic actors?Not designed for AI agents. The system was physical and human-centric — face-to-face market exchanges, printed paper notes, visual authentication of currency. No programmatic interface, no API, no machine-readable monetary rules. The underlying concept could be digitized for AI interaction, but the historical implementation has no AI compatibility.	1

Inclusivity

3.8

Code	Question	Score
IN-01	Can anyone in the world participate regardless of nationality, wealth, or status?Within Argentina, participation was open to anyone regardless of wealth, social status, employment status, or educational background. The system was designed specifically for people excluded from the formal peso economy. No minimum balance, no credit check, no identity verification beyond local community membership. However, participation was geographically restricted — primarily Argentina, with small extensions to neighboring countries. Global accessibility was not a design goal. [1][2]	3
IN-02	What is the minimum cost to start using the project?Effectively zero cost. New members received 50 créditos upon joining — a starter allocation that enabled immediate participation. No upfront payment in pesos was required to participate. Some nodes charged a small administrative fee. Transaction costs were zero (physical cash exchange at market fairs). The barrier to entry was among the lowest of any monetary system. [1][2]	5
IN-03	Does the project actively serve underbanked or financially excluded populations?The system was designed specifically for financially excluded populations. During the 2001-2002 crisis, with 20%+ unemployment and bank accounts frozen under the corralito, the trueque was the primary economic survival mechanism for millions. Over two-thirds of participants were women, many of them from low-income households with no access to formal employment. The system served the underbanked by design and in practice. [1][2]	5
IN-04	Does the project distribute economic benefits — including seigniorage — broadly, or concentrate them among insiders?Mixed. In the original design, all seigniorage was distributed equally (50 créditos to each new member). No private capture, no VC allocation, no founder tokens. However, the franchise model introduced seigniorage extraction by the Bernal founders (4% fee on crédito requests). The P2P Foundation documents "probable appropriation by the management group of large amounts of notes for their own gain." The system started with exemplary distribution but developed insider extraction over time. [1][2]	3
IN-05	Does the project treat all participants equally under the same rules?At the node level, all prosumidores operated under the same rules — equal access to the marketplace, equal initial crédito allocation, no tiered pricing or preferential treatment. The prosumidor concept explicitly treated everyone as simultaneously producer and consumer. However, node coordinators had privileges (control over membership, marketplace access, and credit distribution) that regular members did not. The system was egalitarian in design but hierarchical in practice. [1][2]	4
IN-06	Does the project require identity documentation or surveillance to participate?No government identity documentation required. Membership was community-based — you joined a local node by attending and participating. A membership packet was provided but did not require formal ID. Physical cash transactions left no surveillance trail. The system was accessible to undocumented individuals and those lacking formal identification. [1][2]	4
IN-07	Does the project have mechanisms to prevent wealth concentration over time?The equal initial allocation (50 créditos per member) was an anti-concentration starting point. The Twelve Principles emphasized solidarity and reciprocity. However, no active anti-concentration mechanism existed — no demurrage, no progressive fees, no redistribution. The system's biggest concentration problem was at the coordinator level (those who controlled printing accumulated disproportionate power and, reportedly, notes). No structural prevention of wealth accumulation within the system. [1][2]	3

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) and what problem does it solve?

How is money created in Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network)?

Semi-open, permissioned set of issuers. Each node coordinator could request créditos from the network or, in many cases, individual nodes and regional networks printed their own currency variants. By early 2001 there were several dozen currency varieties in circulation.

How does Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) maintain stable spending power?

No explicit stability mechanism. The crédito was initially pegged 1:1 to the Argentine peso, but this peg was aspirational rather than enforced by any mechanism. No algorithmic adjustment, no rebase, no rate-setting.

Is Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) independent from fiat currencies?

The crédito was its own named unit of account, but it was explicitly pegged to the Argentine peso at inception. Prices at trueque markets were set in créditos, and goods were priced in crédito units, but the peso served as the reference for valuation. The unit was nominally sovereign but functionally dependent on the peso.

Who controls Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) and can it be shut down?

The Argentine government could have shut down the system through legal action but chose not to (it tolerated the trueque as a social safety valve during the crisis). The system was not shut down by a single entity — it collapsed from internal governance failures and external economic improvement. However, the RGT founders in Bernal controlled the franchise model and the arbolito printing, giving them effective veto power over nodes within their network.

How widely adopted is Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) today?

At peak (first half 2002): estimated 2.5 million participants across approximately 5,000 nodes. By July 2002, 7-10% of Argentina's population participated. Today: minimal.

Is Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) still active and growing?

The RGT as a system is defunct. The network collapsed from 2.5 million participants to approximately 10% of its peak by 2003, and continued declining to about 5% thereafter. Small trueque activities persist in Argentina — particularly resurging during economic crises (2009, 2023-2024) — but the organized Red Global de Trueque network no longer operates at meaningful scale.

What are the main risks or weaknesses of Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network)?

Weakest category: Spending Power Stability (1.3).

What makes Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) unique from an M69 perspective?

Strongest category: Inclusivity (3.8): The RGT was purpose-built for the financially excluded. Zero-cost entry with a 50-crédito starter allocation, no identity requirements, over two-thirds female participation, and genuine service to populations locked out of the banking system during Argentina's worst economic crisis. The prosumidor concept — everyone is simultaneously producer and consumer — is a powerful egalitarian design principle.

How is Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network)'s M69 Score calculated?

Red Global de Trueque (Global Barter Network) scores 2.4/5.0 overall. Pillar scores: Monetary Sovereignty 2.4, Civilizational Durability 2.1, Universal Adoption 2.7. Strongest: Inclusivity (3.8). Weakest: Spending Power Stability (1.3).