Sikoba

Peer-to-Peer IOU Platform

Peer-to-peer IOU platform enabling informal credit networks and bilateral settlement.

Type	Peer-to-Peer IOU Platform
Region	Global
Status	Beta
Links	Website GitHub X / Twitter

M69 Score

M69 Alignment2.2

Minimally aligned

1.02.03.04.05.0

Monetary Sovereignty2.6

Issuance (3x) + Stability (2x) + Fiat Indep. (2x)

Civilizational Durability1.4

Sovereignty + Governance + Resilience

Universal Adoption2.0

Traction (2x) + Inclusivity

Iss Mod3x

3.4

Stability2x

1.2

Fia Ind & Int2x

2.9

Traction2x

1.5

Sovereignty

1.7

Governance

1.2

Resilience

1.3

Inclusivity

2.9

Scored against the Money2069 Manifesto — see methodology. Higher = more aligned.

Key Findings

Strongest category is Issuance Model (3.4)because the mutual credit design is genuinely innovative from an M69 perspective -- IOUs are created through bilateral trust tied to real economic relationships, supply is inherently elastic with automatic contraction via debt clearing, and no central bank or debt-based mechanism is involved. This is conceptually one of the most M69-aligned issuance models assessed.

Fiat Independence (2.9) and Inclusivity (2.9) are the next strongestbecause the system has zero fiat reserves by design (mutual credit needs no collateral), supports local currency composability (BekiPay/Beki partnership), and was explicitly designed for underbanked populations in developing countries with no minimum balance or KYC requirements. These are design-level strengths, not demonstrated operational ones.

Traction (1.5) is near-eliminatorybecause the mainnet was never launched, there are effectively zero active users, no merchants accept the currency, and the project shows no growth. The most recent substantial public communication is from late 2020, with a brief DAO migration note in April 2023. This gap between concept and execution is the project's fundamental weakness.

Civilizational Durability pillar is the weakest (1.4)Governance (1.2), Resilience (1.3), and Sovereignty (1.7) all score poorly because the project is centrally controlled by a small team, has never been stress-tested, runs on proprietary centralized infrastructure, depends on niche technology (Crystal language, Babble consensus), and has no sustainable funding model.

Notable tension: Sikoba's monetary design is philosophically among the most M69-aligned concepts in the alternative currency space, but it has failed to translate this into a functioning, adopted system.The gap between Issuance Model (3.4) and Traction (1.5) is one of the widest in any M69 assessment -- a 1.9-point spread that reflects a project stuck in perpetual development. The big takeaway is that conceptual alignment without execution delivers minimal real-world M69 impact, and any investment or partnership decision should be contingent on evidence of renewed development activity and a credible path to launch.

Detailed Rating Breakdown

Framework v0.2-alpha · Rated 2026-04-12

Sikoba is a blockchain-based peer-to-peer IOU platform that enables users to create, track, and clear mutual credit obligations. Founded by Aleksander (Alex) Kampa in Luxembourg and registered as Sikoba Ltd in London (UK Company 10283521), the project aims to digitize informal credit networks that already exist in developing economies. The core mechanism allows trusted participants to grant each other credit lines, transact via IOUs, and benefit from automatic circular debt clearing -- reducing the need for cash settlement. From an M69 alignment perspective, Sikoba's conceptual design is strongly aligned with the vision of debt-free, activity-linked money. Its mutual credit model creates money through bilateral trust rather than centralized debt issuance, and its focus on underbanked populations resonates with the inclusivity commandment. The automatic debt clearing mechanism and the vision for local currency composability (demonstrated by the Beki regional currency partnership in Luxembourg) show genuine monetary innovation. However, the project suffers from critical execution and traction gaps. The mainnet has never launched -- tokens remain ERC-20 placeholders on Ethereum. The last meaningful public updates date to late 2020, with the most recent Medium article by Alex Kampa from March 2021. The SKO token shows zero transfers in the last 24 hours on Etherscan with only ~1.7 million tokens of 100 million max supply in circulation. A DAO migration to Cosmos (SKOJ on daodao.zone) was announced in April 2023 but shows minimal subsequent activity. The project appears to be in a dormant or near-dormant state, which severely limits scores across traction, resilience, and governance categories despite the strength of its underlying monetary design concepts.

Issuance Model3x

3.4

Code	Question	Score
IM-01	Is issuance permissionless?Issuance of IOUs is semi-open: any user can create IOUs, but only within established credit lines granted by counterparties who know and trust them. The system requires mutual agreement between parties rather than unilateral minting. This is rule-based but permissioned by bilateral trust. [1][2]	3
IM-02	Is new supply created through debt?IOUs are by definition acknowledgments of debt, but in Sikoba's mutual credit model, the "debt" is bilateral and self-canceling through clearing rather than created through borrowing from a central issuer. Credit is extended peer-to-peer with no interest-bearing lending from a bank. This is a mixed model -- technically debt-based (IOUs are obligations) but fundamentally different from fractional reserve or collateralized debt issuance. [1][2]	3
IM-03	Is issuance tied to measurable real-world economic activity?Credit lines in Sikoba are granted between parties who know each other from real-world commercial relationships (e.g., a store owner granting credit to regular customers). Issuance is directly linked to real economic relationships and trade activity, though the link is social/bilateral rather than algorithmic. [1][2]	4
IM-04	Does the issuance model have a supply cap or hard ceiling?The IOU supply is inherently elastic -- it expands when credit lines are drawn and contracts when debts are cleared or settled. The automatic circular debt clearing algorithm actively reduces outstanding IOUs. There is no hard cap; supply responds to economic activity within the network. [1][2]	4
IM-05	Can supply contract (burn/redemption) as well as expand?Contraction is a core feature: the automatic debt clearing mechanism reduces circular debt, and IOUs are extinguished when settled in cash or through clearing. This is inherent to the mutual credit design. Contraction is automatic and continuous via the clearing algorithm. [1][2]	3

Spending Power Stability2x

1.2

Code	Question	Score
SPS-01	What mechanism does the protocol use to target spending power stability?Sikoba has no explicit spending power stability mechanism. IOUs are denominated in whatever currency the parties agree on (e.g., local fiat). The platform does not target any price index or adjust supply algorithmically for stability. The clearing mechanism reduces outstanding debt but does not target purchasing power. [1][2]	1
SPS-02	What benchmark is used to measure spending power?No benchmark exists. IOUs are denominated in fiat-equivalent terms (the SKS internal gas token was designed to be pegged to XDR at 1 XDR = 150 SKS for transaction fees, but this applies only to the gas token, not to IOUs). IOUs inherit the spending power characteristics of whatever currency they reference. [1][2]	1
SPS-03	How transparent and verifiable is the stability measurement?No stability measurement exists. The Horizen partnership provides transaction verification via Merkle proofs on a public blockchain, but this verifies transaction integrity, not spending power stability. [1]	1
SPS-04	What is the protocol's historical deviation from its stability target?No stability target exists, and the mainnet has never launched. There is no live track record of any kind. [1][2]	1
SPS-05	Does the protocol distinguish between short-term volatility and long-term purchasing power drift?The BekiPay partnership (regional currency in Luxembourg) planned to implement a demurrage mechanism, which addresses long-term purchasing power drift by discouraging hoarding. However, this was specific to one planned deployment and is not a core protocol feature. The protocol itself makes no distinction between timescales. [1]	2
SPS-06	Is the stability mechanism accessible globally?No stability mechanism exists. The IOU platform itself was designed for global use with 15 language translations, but this addresses accessibility of the platform, not stability. [1]	1

Fiat Independence & Interoperability2x

2.9

Code	Question	Score
FI-01	What is the protocol's unit of account?IOUs in Sikoba are denominated in whatever currency the parties agree on -- typically local fiat currencies. The SKS gas token was designed to track XDR (a basket of currencies). The protocol does not impose its own sovereign unit of account; it is a platform for creating IOUs in existing denominations. [1][2]	2
FI-02	What is the fiat composition of the protocol's collateral or reserves?Sikoba is a mutual credit system with no collateral or reserves. IOUs are backed by the bilateral trust between participants, not by any asset. This is structurally fiat-free (no reserves at all), which is fundamentally different from fiat-backed systems. [1][2]	5
FI-03	Does the protocol depend on fiat banking infrastructure to function?The core IOU system does not require banking infrastructure. Settlement of residual balances may use fiat, but the core credit creation, tracking, and clearing functions operate without banks. [1][2]	4
FI-04	Are the protocol's price feeds and oracles fiat-denominated?Sikoba does not use price oracles. IOUs are denominated directly in agreed-upon currencies. The SKS gas token references XDR, a fiat-composite index. No on-chain oracle system exists. [1]	2
FI-05	What happens to the protocol if the primary fiat currency it references collapses or depegs?Since IOUs are denominated in whatever currency parties choose, a fiat collapse would affect the denominated value of existing IOUs but not the platform itself. New IOUs could be denominated in alternative units. The platform is currency-agnostic in design. [1][2]	4
FI-06	Does the project have a credible transition path from fiat-dominated adoption to fiat-independent operation?Sikoba acknowledges that IOUs can be denominated in any unit, and the partner page mentions local currencies as a use case. However, no formal transition plan from fiat denomination exists. The platform is designed to be currency-neutral rather than fiat-independent. [1]	2
FI-07	Can local or sectoral currencies be denominated in or settle against this currency?This is a core design feature. The BekiPay partnership demonstrates local currency issuance on the platform (e-Beki regional currency in Luxembourg). The partners page lists local currencies as a primary use case. The architecture natively supports multiple local currency implementations. [1][2]	3
FI-08	Does the protocol define open standards for interoperability with other monetary systems?No open interoperability standard is defined. The Horizen integration provides public verification of transactions but is not a monetary interoperability standard. Interoperability between Sikoba instances or with other credit systems is not documented. [1]	1

Traction2x

1.5

Code	Question	Score
TR-01	Is the project still active?The project appears largely dormant. The last Medium update from the Sikoba Network account dates to late 2020. Alex Kampa's last Medium article is from March 2021. A DAO migration was announced in April 2023, but no subsequent activity is visible. The SKO token shows zero transfers in the past 24 hours. The website still exists but shows a 2021 copyright. [1][2][3]	2
TR-02	How long has the project been in existence?Sikoba launched its ICO presale in April 2017. The UK company was registered earlier. As of 2026, the project has existed for approximately 9 years, though most of that time has been in development or dormancy rather than active operation. [1][2]	4
TR-03	How many active users does the project have?No public user metrics exist. The beta testing phase (2020) required emailing for a beta key. The SKO token has 7,307 holders on Etherscan, but these are token holders, not platform users. The mainnet never launched. Active platform users appear to be effectively zero. [1][2]	1
TR-04	How many businesses or organizations accept the project's currency?The BekiPay partnership with De Kar (Beki regional currency) was the most concrete merchant adoption effort, but it was announced in September 2020 for a January 2021 launch, with no evidence of operational deployment. No merchants are known to actively use the system. [1]	1
TR-05	Is the currency used as a unit of account?IOUs in Sikoba are denominated in existing currencies (typically fiat). The platform itself does not create a native unit of account that is independently used for pricing. No evidence of any Sikoba-native denomination being used to price goods or services. [1]	1
TR-06	Is the founder or core team still actively working on the project?Alex Kampa's last public Sikoba-related output is from April 2020 on Medium. The DAO migration in April 2023 suggests some activity, but no sustained public engagement since. The team listed on ICOholder (6 members) has not been publicly active. [1][2]	2
TR-07	What partner organizations or institutions support or integrate the project?Historical partnerships include Horizen (blockchain verification, 2020), De Kar/Beki (regional currency, 2020), Chelma (Kenya microcredit, 2020), Libranzas Group SAS (Colombia, 2020), and Manas.tech (development). However, none of these partnerships show evidence of current activity. [1][2]	2
TR-08	Is the project covered or recognized by credible external sources?Covered by niche crypto and alternative finance media (CryptoNinjas, Alternative Credit Investor, Crowdfund Insider, PRNewswire). No academic papers or major media coverage found. Coverage is concentrated in 2017-2020 period. [1][2]	2
TR-09	Is adoption organic -- not dependent on subsidies, incentives, or mandates?With effectively no active users, the question of organic vs. incentivized adoption is moot. The beta testing phase appeared to be organic (no token incentives for usage). However, there is no demonstrated adoption of any kind. [1][2]	1
TR-10	What is the growth trend over the past 12 months?No evidence of any growth. The project shows no public updates, no new partnerships, no user growth, and zero token transfer activity in recent periods. The trajectory is stagnation or decline. [1][2]	1
TR-11	Does the project have a coherent narrative and cultural identity that drives long-term commitment?Sikoba has a clear founding narrative around formalizing informal credit and enabling "banking without money." The vision is intellectually coherent and aligned with alternative monetary thinking. However, there is no active community, no cultural artifacts beyond the website, and no evidence of community engagement. [1][2]	2

Sovereignty

1.7

Code	Question	Score
SO-01	Can any single entity shut down the project?Sikoba Ltd (UK company) controls the platform infrastructure. The mainnet was never launched as a decentralized network. Alex Kampa as founder/director could effectively shut down operations. The federated blockchain with Babble consensus was in development but not deployed. [1][2]	2
SO-02	Is the project's core infrastructure permissionless and self-hostable?Some code is on GitHub (sko-public, isekai, cryptographic libraries), but the core SikobaPay platform is not fully open-source. The README states plans to expand public offerings "in the future." The blockchain layer code is partially available (babble_demo branch) but full release was planned post-mainnet. [1][2]	2
SO-03	Is the project subject to the jurisdiction of a single nation-state?Sikoba Ltd is registered in London, UK (Company 10283521). The founder is Luxembourg-based. The DAO migration to Cosmos/Juno aimed to reduce jurisdictional concentration, but the company remains the primary legal entity. [1][2]	2
SO-04	Does the project control or custody user funds?In the mutual credit model, there are no "funds" to custody -- IOUs are bilateral obligations between participants. However, the centralized backend (PostgreSQL, Redis) means the platform operator holds the authoritative record of all credit lines and IOUs. Users cannot independently verify or control their balances without the platform. [1][2]	2
SO-05	Is the project resilient to key-person risk?The project is heavily dependent on Alex Kampa as founder, director, and primary public face. The team of 6 listed on ICOholder is small, and there is no evidence of successor leadership or distributed knowledge. [1][2]	2
SO-06	Does the project depend on any third-party service that could be revoked?The platform depends on its own centralized infrastructure. The Horizen integration depends on the Horizen blockchain. The Cosmos/Juno DAO depends on those chains. The mobile app depends on Apple TestFlight and Google Play. Multiple revocable dependencies. [1][2]	2
SO-07	Can the project be censored -- can specific users or transactions be blocked?The centralized backend gives the operator full capability to block users or transactions. The federated blockchain design (if deployed) would distribute this power among federation nodes, but the mainnet was never launched. Currently, censorship is trivially possible. [1]	2
SO-08	Does the protocol protect transaction privacy as a monetary right?The Horizen integration using zk-SNARKs was designed to enable private verification of transactions. However, the centralized backend stores all transaction data. The Merkle proof system allows public verification without revealing transaction details, but the operator sees everything. Privacy protections are aspirational, not operational. [1]	2
SO-09	Does the technology enforce the project's monetary rules such that governance cannot silently override them?The mainnet was never launched. The current system runs on a centralized backend (Crystal/PostgreSQL) where the operator has full control over all parameters. No immutable smart contracts enforce monetary rules. The planned federated blockchain would have improved this, but it was never deployed. [1][2]	1

Governance

1.2

Code	Question	Score
GO-01	How are decisions about the project made?Decisions are made by Alex Kampa and the small core team. The April 2023 DAO on daodao.zone/Cosmos was announced but shows no evidence of active governance proposals or votes. No formalized governance process is documented. [1][2]	1
GO-02	Who has voting or decision-making power, and how is that power distributed?Sikoba Ltd retains 40% of tokens; the Sikoba Foundation holds 10%. Combined insider allocation is 50%+ of tokens. The SKOJ DAO governance token distribution is unclear but derived from SKO holders. Decision power is concentrated in the founding team. [1]	1
GO-03	Is the governance process -- and the monetary mechanism itself -- transparent and publicly auditable?The core SikobaPay code is not fully open-source. Some components are on GitHub but the full platform is closed. The token economics paper is published but governance deliberations are not publicly recorded. The DAO on daodao.zone could provide transparency, but there is no evidence of active proposals or votes. [1][2]	2
GO-04	Can governance be captured by a small group or hostile actor?Governance is already controlled by the founding team. With 50%+ of tokens held by insiders, the DAO (if active) would be capturable by the founding team alone. No anti-capture mechanisms exist. [1]	1
GO-05	How are upgrades and changes to the protocol or project proposed and executed?No documented upgrade process. Changes are made by the development team. The DAO could theoretically provide a governance process, but it shows no activity. [1]	1
GO-06	Is there a separation between governance over monetary policy and governance over operational decisions?No separation exists. All decisions are made by the same small team. No constitutional distinction between monetary and operational governance. [1]	1
GO-07	Does the project have a constitution, charter, or set of immutable principles?The project has stated principles about decentralizing credit and serving the unbanked, but these are marketing statements, not a binding constitution. No immutable principles are enshrined in code or governance documents. [1][2]	2
GO-08	Can the project's issuance rules be changed, and are monetary policy changes subject to stronger constraints than operational changes?Issuance rules (credit line parameters) are set by individual participants, which provides some decentralization. However, the platform operator controls the clearing algorithms, fee structures, and system-level monetary parameters with no constraints. A single entity can change these unilaterally. [1]	1

Resilience

1.3

Code	Question	Score
RE-01	Has the project survived a major crisis or adversarial event?The project has never faced adversarial conditions because the mainnet was never launched and there are no active users. The project's primary crisis is its own stagnation. No stress testing of the monetary mechanism has occurred. [1][2]	1
RE-02	Does the project have redundancy in its critical infrastructure?The centralized backend (PostgreSQL, Redis, Crystal server) has no documented redundancy. The Horizen integration provides some verification redundancy but is not critical infrastructure. No evidence of multiple nodes, mirrors, or failover systems. [1]	1
RE-03	Can the project recover from a catastrophic failure?Some code is on GitHub. The concept is well-documented enough that it could be rebuilt. However, the proprietary backend code is not fully public, and no disaster recovery plan is documented. Recovery would depend on the founding team. [1]	2
RE-04	Is the project's design simple enough to be maintained and understood long-term?The core concept (P2P IOUs with clearing) is elegant and simple. The technical implementation involves multiple components (Crystal backend, Babble consensus, Horizen integration, mobile/web apps) adding moderate complexity. The concept itself is accessible. [1][2]	3
RE-05	Is the project dependent on a specific technology that could become obsolete?Built primarily in Crystal, a niche programming language. The Babble consensus middleware is not widely adopted. The Horizen/Zendoo integration depends on that specific chain. Multiple dependencies on niche technologies. [1][2]	2
RE-06	How does the project handle economic stress (bank runs, liquidity crises, collateral crashes, inflation/deflation shocks)?In a mutual credit system, "bank runs" manifest as widespread refusal to honor IOUs. Sikoba has no explicit mechanisms for this -- credit lines are bilateral, so defaults are contained to individual relationships. However, there is no formal stress testing, no circuit breakers, and no demonstrated resilience. [1]	1
RE-07	Does the project have sustainable funding for long-term maintenance?The 2017 ICO raised funds (amount undisclosed). Sikoba Ltd retains 40% of tokens, but the SKO token appears to have negligible market value. No evidence of ongoing revenue, grants, or sustainable funding model. The project appears to operate on minimal resources. [1][2]	1
RE-08	Can the system operate across extreme latency, disconnected networks, and multi-century timescales?The IOU concept itself is inherently latency-tolerant -- IOUs can be recorded and settled asynchronously. However, the current implementation requires online connectivity to the central server. The concept could be adapted for disconnected operation, but this is not designed. [1]	2
RE-09	Is the system designed for a world where AI agents are primary economic actors?No consideration of AI agents. The system requires human participants who "know and trust each other in real life." The trust-based credit model fundamentally assumes human social relationships. AI participation is not addressed. [1]	1

Inclusivity

2.9

Code	Question	Score
IN-01	Can anyone in the world participate regardless of nationality, wealth, or status?The platform was designed for global access with 15 language translations. No minimum balance, no KYC requirement, no nationality restrictions in the design. However, the beta required emailing for access (gatekeeping), and the mainnet never launched. In design, it is open; in practice, it is inaccessible. [1][2]	3
IN-02	What is the minimum cost to start using the project?The IOU system requires no upfront capital -- that is its core value proposition. Users can transact without having money. Transaction fees on the planned network would use the SKS gas token. In the beta, there was no cost to participate beyond having a phone. [1][2]	4
IN-03	Does the project actively serve underbanked or financially excluded populations?Explicitly designed for the 300+ million small businesses in developing countries that rely on informal credit. The Chelma partnership in Kenya (training women entrepreneurs in Kisii County) and the Colombia micro-credit initiative demonstrate active outreach to underbanked populations. However, these initiatives appear to have stalled. [1][2]	3
IN-04	Does the project distribute economic benefits -- including seigniorage -- broadly, or concentrate them among insiders?Token distribution: 40% Sikoba Ltd, 10% Foundation, 10% marketing, 40% sold. This is a 60/40 insider/public split. The ISPE mechanism redistributes SKO to federation node operators and users as incentives, but the heavy insider allocation (50%+ retained) concentrates benefits. [1]	2
IN-05	Does the project treat all participants equally under the same rules?In the mutual credit model, all participants operate under the same rules -- credit lines are bilateral agreements between equals. There are no tiered access levels or preferential treatment in the IOU system itself. The token economics, however, give insiders preferential terms. [1][2]	3
IN-06	Does the project require identity documentation or surveillance to participate?The beta required a mobile phone number for registration (light identity). No government ID or KYC was required. The platform relies on real-world trust relationships, which implies users know each other, but formal identity verification is not required by the system. [1][2]	3
IN-07	Does the project have mechanisms to prevent wealth concentration over time?The BekiPay partnership planned to implement demurrage (a holding fee that discourages hoarding). The mutual credit model itself limits concentration because credit lines are bilateral and based on real relationships. However, no active anti-concentration mechanisms are deployed. The demurrage feature was planned but not confirmed as operational. [1]	2

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Sikoba and what problem does it solve?

How is money created in Sikoba?

Issuance of IOUs is semi-open: any user can create IOUs, but only within established credit lines granted by counterparties who know and trust them. The system requires mutual agreement between parties rather than unilateral minting. This is rule-based but permissioned by bilateral trust.

How does Sikoba maintain stable spending power?

Sikoba has no explicit spending power stability mechanism. IOUs are denominated in whatever currency the parties agree on (e.g., local fiat). The platform does not target any price index or adjust supply algorithmically for stability.

Is Sikoba independent from fiat currencies?

IOUs in Sikoba are denominated in whatever currency the parties agree on -- typically local fiat currencies. The SKS gas token was designed to track XDR (a basket of currencies). The protocol does not impose its own sovereign unit of account; it is a platform for creating IOUs in existing denominations.

Who controls Sikoba and can it be shut down?

Sikoba Ltd (UK company) controls the platform infrastructure. The mainnet was never launched as a decentralized network. Alex Kampa as founder/director could effectively shut down operations.

How widely adopted is Sikoba today?

No public user metrics exist. The beta testing phase (2020) required emailing for a beta key. The SKO token has 7,307 holders on Etherscan, but these are token holders, not platform users.

Is Sikoba still active and growing?

The project appears largely dormant. The last Medium update from the Sikoba Network account dates to late 2020. Alex Kampa's last Medium article is from March 2021.

What are the main risks or weaknesses of Sikoba?

Civilizational Durability pillar is the weakest (1.4): Governance (1.2), Resilience (1.3), and Sovereignty (1.7) all score poorly because the project is centrally controlled by a small team, has never been stress-tested, runs on proprietary centralized infrastructure, depends on niche technology (Crystal language, Babble consensus), and has no sustainable funding model.

What makes Sikoba unique from an M69 perspective?

Strongest category is Issuance Model (3.4): because the mutual credit design is genuinely innovative from an M69 perspective -- IOUs are created through bilateral trust tied to real economic relationships, supply is inherently elastic with automatic contraction via debt clearing, and no central bank or debt-based mechanism is involved. This is conceptually one of the most M69-aligned issuance models assessed.

How is Sikoba's M69 Score calculated?

Sikoba scores 2.2/5.0 overall. Pillar scores: Monetary Sovereignty 2.6, Civilizational Durability 1.4, Universal Adoption 2.0. Strongest: Issuance Model (3.4). Weakest: Governance (1.2).